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Abstract
Research Summary: This paper examines how incumbent
firms' market positions and interdependencies across their
submarkets influence their responses to entry threats. We
adapt a model of capacity deterrence to show that because
premium and low-cost incumbents face different demand
functions and operating costs, they experience different
tradeoffs between ignoring, deterring, and accommodating
threatened entry. In addition, the interdependencies within
and between a premium incumbent's submarkets influence
its responses. Using data on incumbent responses to entry
threats from Southwest Airlines between 2003 and 2012,
we find that (a) full-service incumbents expanded capacity
while low-cost incumbents did not respond significantly,
and (b) full-service incumbents expanded capacity less
aggressively in submarkets that had less substitutable cus-
tomer segments and submarkets that were more comple-
mentary with their unthreatened submarkets.
Managerial Summary: An immutable market position is a
core competitive advantage. Using data on incumbent
responses to entry threats from Southwest Airlines
between 2003 and 2012, we find that (a) full-service
(FSC) incumbents expanded capacity while low-cost
(LCC) incumbents did not respond significantly, and
(b) FSCs expanded capacity less aggressively on routes
that were expected to have a large number of business pas-
sengers and routes that connected to their international
hubs. These results suggest two sources of positional
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immutability: While one set of past choices (e.g., those
about submarket substitutability or complementarity) pro-
vide a barrier against imitation, another set of past choices
(e.g., those about products and costs) generate incentives
for a tough defense, both deterring entry by firms from a
different position.
KEYWORD S
airlines, competitive interaction, entry deterrence, interdependence,
market position
1 | INTRODUCTION
A classic prescription for attaining competitive advantage is for firms to identify and enter an attrac-
tive industry, and to identify and occupy an attractive market position within that industry (Porter,
1980). A market position aggregates a distinct set of interdependent strategic choices including
choices about resources, prices, quality, and submarkets1 (Porter, 1980). The interdependencies and
tradeoffs among these choices are assumed to serve as a barrier to imitation and entry by firms from
different positions, thereby sustaining the position's competitive advantage (Porter, 1985, 1991):
Firms seeking to migrate across positions will face a “repositioning cost” in changing their historical
choices about resources, prices, quality, and submarkets (Menon & Yao, 2017). Despite the large
body of research on market positions, the crucial assumption that market positions are largely insu-
lated from direct competition from other positions and that competitive interaction occurs mostly
within rather than across positions has yet to be formally explored and empirically tested. In an effort
to improve our understanding of the sources of immutability that protect market positions, this paper
examines how the dynamics of competitive interaction vary within and across market positions.
We note that there is a vibrant and growing literature on competitive interactions (see excellent
reviews by Chen and Miller (2012, 2015); and more recent work by Makadok and Ross (2018)).
While this literature has resulted in a better understanding of competitive dynamics within industries
and the articulation of a theoretical framework (the Awareness-Motivation-Capability model), there
is limited cross-pollination with the literature on market positions. For example, the multimarket-
contact literature is more concerned with competitive interaction between firms across multiple
overlapping submarkets than competitive interaction within each submarket arising from positional
differences (Gimeno & Woo, 1999). Similarly, the emerging research about platform competition
focuses on firms with different business models such as newspapers and classified advertisement
websites rather than firms with different positions (Seamans & Zhu, 2017). In addition to general
positional differences, differences in submarket interdependencies, or interdependences existing
either between segments within the same submarket or between different submarkets that a firm
operates in, are understudied. To the extent that market positions reflect mutually reinforcing,
interdependent choices (Ghemawat & Levinthal, 2008), a focus on interdependencies among
1Throughout this paper, the word “market” refers to the entire market in an industry when it appears in the phrase “market
position.” The word “submarket” refers to individual markets in different locations or product categories operated by a firm.
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position-specific choices, including choices of submarkets, will help us understand how competitive
interactions vary within and across market positions.
Against this background, the current paper examines the impact of market positions and sub-
market interdependencies on one specific form of competitive interaction—entry deterrence. We
adopt a multi-method approach, first developing the theory through a formal model and then testing
the predictions using data from the U.S. airline industry. We adapt a classic model of capacity
response to entry threat (Dixit, 1980; Spence, 1977) by introducing two enhancements. First, we
allow incumbents to occupy different market positions—premium versus low-cost—with
interdependent demand and cost consequences. This affords examination of intra-industry heteroge-
neity in competitive responses from incumbents with different market positions to entry threats. Sec-
ond, we allow incumbents to differ in the degree of interdependencies within and between the
submarkets they choose to operate in. This results in heterogeneous competitive responses from the
same incumbent across different submarkets.
We make two important assumptions about the differences between premium and low-cost firms.
First, we assume that premium and low-cost firms face different demand curves: Consumers of pre-
mium products are less price sensitive than consumers of low-cost products. Second, we assume that
premium firms incur higher operating costs than low-cost firms: Product or service differentiation is
costly. Building on these two assumptions, our model predicts that when capacity expansion costs
are sufficiently lower than operating costs, a premium incumbent will be more aggressive than a
low-cost incumbent in deterring entry. The intuition is that because a premium incumbent has a
higher operating cost than a low-cost incumbent, the monopolistic output for the premium incumbent
is lower than that of the low-cost incumbent in a similar market, which leaves a bigger residual
demand for the entrant and makes the entry more likely. In addition, compared with a low-cost
entrant, the premium incumbent's disadvantage in operating cost and advantage in demand (lower
price sensitivity) make accommodation less profitable relative to deterrence. As a result, a premium
incumbent will be more aggressive than a low-cost incumbent to deter rather than to ignore or
accommodate entry.
We then build on this baseline prediction to deepen our understanding of heterogeneity in
responses from a premium incumbent across its threatened submarkets. We allow for a premium
incumbent to operate in multiple submarkets with different degrees of demand-side interdepen-
dencies within and between them. We show that two types of interdependencies moderate a premium
incumbent's response. The first type is the substitutability between customer segments within a
threatened submarket. If the submarket is largely comprised of customers that strongly prefer the pre-
mium product and are unattracted to the product offering of a low-cost entrant, the benefit of an
aggressive deterrence response is likely to be outweighed by the forgone profit of an accommodation
strategy. However, if a significant share of customers is willing to substitute the premium product
with the low-cost product, the benefits of deterrence will outweigh the forgone profit from accommo-
dation. Consistent with these arguments, our model predicts that the degree of substitutability in a
premium incumbent's threatened submarket amplifies its incentive to deter entry.
The second type of interdependence is the complementarity between the threatened and
unthreatened submarkets that a premium incumbent operates in. If the unthreatened submarkets share
a high degree of complementarity with the threatened submarket, the negative effect of entry for the
incumbent in the threatened submarket can be counterbalanced by positive effects in complementary
submarkets: while losing business volume to an entrant in the threatened submarket hurts local
profits for the incumbent, the increase in total demand in this submarket can contribute to the incum-
bent's business volume in unthreatened submarkets. Consistent with these arguments, our model
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predicts that the degree of complementarity across a premium incumbent's submarkets dampens its
incentive to deter entry.
We test these predictions using fine grained data in the airline industry, where there is a clear
mapping between market positions and airlines—full-service (premium) carriers (FSCs) and low-cost
carriers (LCCs). We examine the capacity responses of FSC and LCC incumbents to submarket-
(route-) level threat of entry by Southwest Airlines from 2003 to 2012. We find evidence consistent
with our predictions. First, FSC incumbents increased seat capacity, while LCC incumbents did not
respond significantly to the threat of entry. In addition, there was significant heterogeneity in FSC
incumbents' responses across their threatened submarkets. They added less seat capacity on threat-
ened routes that were expected to have a larger proportion of business-class passengers (who are less
likely to substitute their demand for premium service with that for low-cost service) and routes that
connected to the incumbent’ international hubs (where there is high complementarity between the
threatened domestic market and the unthreatened international markets).
The paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it connects the research on entry deter-
rence in industrial organization with the research on market positions in strategic management. Spe-
cifically, we incorporate market positions and submarket interdependencies into a classic model of
entry deterrence. We show that incumbent firms' past choices of market positions and submarket
interdependencies influence their competitive behavior. These past choices provide two sources of
positional immutability: While one set of past choices (e.g., those about submarket interdepen-
dencies) generate barriers that prevent firms from a different position to imitate and enter, another set
of past choices (e.g., those about products and costs) generate position-specific incentives that
encourage a tough defense from the incumbent, thereby deterring entry. We see our effort to both for-
malize the empirical analyses and operationalize the theoretical model as crucial to understanding the
conditions and mechanisms that drive the variation in entry deterrence decisions across different
incumbents or across different submarkets for the same incumbent.
In addition, the current paper enriches the competitive dynamics literature in strategy. It implies
that by strategically exploiting or avoiding submarket interdependencies, firms can employ a unique
set of tools to manage competitive interaction. Furthermore, the paper extends empirical work on
entry deterrence through capacity expansion (Kadiyali, 1996; Lieberman, 1987a, 1987b) by studying
incumbent response to the threat of entry (rather than actual entry). We also empirically examine a
broad range of competitive responses, such as price and quality differentiation, in addition to capac-
ity. This approach offers a comparison with the results in prior studies and a more coherent analysis
of competitive responses to entry threat than prior studies.
2 | RELATED LITERATURE
This paper is mostly related to the research on competitive dynamics in general and entry deterrence
in particular. As summarized in Chen and Miller (2012, 2015), much of the existing work on compet-
itive interaction in the strategy literature focuses on three factors: (a) characteristics of the market,
(b) characteristics of the attacker, and (c) characteristics of the defender/incumbent. Considerations
of market positions and submarket interdependencies are mostly absent.
The literature on response to entry threats is mostly theoretical (e.g., Brander & Eaton, 1984;
Dixit, 1979; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; Schmalensee, 1978; Spence, 1977). It explores whether a
deterrence or accommodation response is optimal. For instance, an incumbent can deter entry
through limit pricing, that is, pricing below the cost of the potential entrant, in order to manipulate
the entrant's perception of post-entry profits (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). Alternatively, the
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incumbent can accommodate entry by keeping the price at the same level or even raising it, hoping
to encourage the entrant to charge a higher price after entry (Pauwels & Srinivasan, 2004). Incum-
bents can also invest in excess capacity to signal post-entry output increase and price decrease,
thereby deterring entry; such investment is credible when the capacity is irreversible, slowly depreci-
ating, specific to the firm, and in excess of current demand (Dixit, 1979; Mazzeo, 2002).
The empirical evidence on strategic responses to entry threats is sparse and mostly about
responses after entry has occurred (e.g., Lieberman, 1987a, 1987b; Lieberman & Demeester, 1999).
Rare exceptions include Seamans (2013), who finds evidence of limit pricing in response to potential
entry in the U.S. cable television industry, and Ellison and Ellison (2011), who find that pharmaceu-
tical incumbents increased prices before their branded drug patents expired. Conlin and Kadiyali
(2006) use capacity to demand ratio as a proxy for the incumbents' entry-deterrence behavior and
find that hotels added more rooms in more-concentrated markets. Few empirical studies have exam-
ined heterogeneity among incumbents. Rare exceptions include Simon (2005), who finds that newer
magazine publishers cut prices more in response to entry, as they felt more vulnerable than the older
incumbents.
There is also a large body of empirical work on the airline industry, with a focus on price or
price–cost margin rather than capacity (see Berry & Jia, 2010 for an important exception). These
studies are discussed in detail when we describe the airline context.
3 | A MODEL OF INCUMBENT RESPONSE TO ENTRY
THREAT
We adapt a formal model of capacity expansion to identify the mechanisms that influence incumbent
responses to entry threats. To save space, we provide the details of the model in Appendix S1,
Supporting Information. In this section, we explain the key assumptions, results, and intuitions of the
model.
We start with the classic single-market model following Dixit (1980) and Spence (1977). In this
model, a monopolistic incumbent and a low-cost entrant, both having complete information about
each other's costs,2 play a two-stage game. Before the game starts, the incumbent operates as a
monopoly in the market at capacity KMi . In the first stage, facing an entry threat, the incumbent
invests in additional capacity Ki−KMi
 
at a constant unit cost of ri. The entrant observes Ki and
decides whether to enter with a fixed entry cost of f and a constant average variable cost of ce. In the
second stage, if entry occurs, the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously choose their output (qi
and qe, respectively) to generate a set of equilibrium outcomes (Stackelberg, 1934). The incumbent's
constant average variable cost is ci if qi≤Ki and ci+ ri if qi>Ki. The inverse demand function is
given by P = 1−Q, where Q = qi+ qe. The incumbent is expected to choose Ki using backward
induction, as illustrated in Section 1 of Appendix S1.
We plot in Figure 1 a framework to analyze the dynamic process as the entry cost declines from
the right of the spectrum to the left. If the entry cost is high enough, entry is not viable for the entrant
even with no response from the incumbent, so the incumbent can ignore the threat. When the entry
cost drops below f D but remains above f A, the incumbent's monopoly is attainable only via deter-
rence. When the entry cost drops below f A, the incumbent will find that accommodation is more
profitable. Finally, if entry cost is sufficiently low and the operating cost of the entrant is lower than
2This is a reasonable assumption in our context given that the incumbent airlines faced actual competition from Southwest on
many routes for at least a decade before our sample period.
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that of the incumbent, the optimal response of the incumbent may be to exit. We focus on these cut-
off points to determine the incumbent's best response. As part of our empirical design, we fix the
potential entrant to be one firm, Southwest Airlines, so that the operating cost of the potential entrant,
ce, is the same for all analyses in the model.
We now extend the basic model and consider the case where the market can support two products,
one low cost (Product 1) and one premium (Product 2). A low-cost incumbent and a low-cost entrant
will always offer Product 1 and face an inverse demand function of P1 = 1 − Q1 − sQ2, where
Q1 = qi + qe, Q2 = 0. A premium incumbent will always offer Product 2 and face an inverse demand
function of P2=1−θQ2−sQ1,Q1=qe  1θ2 0,1½  represents the price sensitivity of consumers for
Product 2, relative to Product 1. 1θ<1 means that consumers are less price sensitive for Product 2 than
for Product 1. s2 [0, 1] represents the degree of substitution between the two products. When s = 0,
the demand functions for the two products are independent: Q1 = 1−P1 and Q2 = 1−P2θ , respectively.





θ−1 , respectively. We compare two scenarios: (a) The monopolist incumbent is a low-cost
firm with the same operating cost as the entrant (ciL = ce), and (b) the monopolistic incumbent is a
premium firm with a higher operating cost than the entrant (ciP > ce).
First, as we prove in Section 2 of Appendix S1, the cutoff point between monopoly and deter-
rence for a low-cost incumbent, f D1, is smaller than the cutoff point for a premium incumbent, f D2.
This means that, as the entry cost declines, the cutoff point for the premium incumbent to deter
(rather than ignore) entry, f D2, is to the right of the cutoff point for the low-cost incumbent to deter,
f D1. The intuition is that, because a premium incumbent has a higher operating cost than a low-cost
incumbent in a similar market, the monopolistic output of the premium incumbent is lower than that
of the low-cost incumbent, which leaves a bigger residual demand for the potential entrant. There-
fore, the premium incumbent needs a higher entry cost f D to ignore entry. That is, as the entry cost
drops, a premium incumbent will start deterring entry earlier than a low-cost incumbent.
Second, we show in Section 2 of Appendix S1 that the cutoff point between deterrence and
accommodation for the low-cost incumbent, f A1, is larger than the cutoff point for the premium
incumbent, f A2, when ri is sufficiently small relative to ci. Intuitively, when investment costs are suf-
ficiently low (relative to operating costs), the incumbent will find it more profitable to invest in deter-
rence capacity than to accommodate entry and give up market share. This preference for deterrence
over accommodation will be stronger for a premium incumbent, because it will lose a larger market
share to the low-cost entrant in a duopolistic market than will a low-cost incumbent. In addition, con-
sumers' lower price sensitivity for a premium product makes accommodation less profitable relative
to deterrence for a premium incumbent compared with a low-cost incumbent.
Combining the analysis of f D and f A, we show that f D2−f A2ð Þ> f D1−f A1ð Þ when ri is sufficiently
small relative to ci. That is, the premium incumbent will be more aggressive in deterring (rather than
ignoring or accommodating) a low-cost firm's entry than will a low-cost incumbent when capacity
Entry costAccommodation Deterrence Monopoly
FIGURE 1 Incumbent's strategic responses as entry cost declines
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investment costs are sufficiently small relative to operating costs. It should be noted that this predic-
tion is in contrast with the argument that strategic similarity (i.e., firms occupying the same market
position) leads to greater rivalry (Gimeno & Woo, 1996). The key reason for the difference is that
our model explicitly considers the tradeoffs an incumbent faces among ignoring, deterring, and
accommodating entry.
Proposition 1. Following the threat of entry from a low-cost entrant, if investment costs are suffi-
ciently low relative to operating costs, a premium incumbent will be more likely to invest in deter-
rence capacity as compared with a low-cost incumbent.
We now build on the baseline prediction in Proposition 1 to examine the situation where a pre-
mium incumbent operates in multiple submarkets, one of which is threatened by a potential low-cost
entrant. We examine how two types of demand-side submarket interdependencies amplify or mitigate
the incumbent's deterrence incentive. The first type of interdependence is demand substitutability
between customer segments within a single threatened submarket, or the degree to which a product
targeted for one segment could be substitutable for a product targeted for another segment.
We examine the premium incumbent's aggressiveness in deterrence as the degree of substitution
between the product targeted for the premium segment and that for the low-cost segment, s, changes.
We show in Section 3 of Appendix S1 that ∂
f D−f Að Þ
∂s >0 for a majority of feasible cases, implying that
the premium incumbent's incentive to deter entry is increasing in the substitutability between the cus-
tomer segment it chooses to serve and the customer segment that the potential low-cost entrant will
serve. The intuition is that, when demand is less substitutable between the two segments, it is more
profitable for the premium incumbent to accommodate entry. This is because the cost of deterrence
to maintain a monopoly is greater than its expected revenue loss under a duopoly with the low-cost
entrant.
Proposition 2. Following the threat of entry from a low-cost entrant, a premium incumbent will be
more likely to invest in deterrence capacity when demand substitutability between the premium and
low-cost segments in the threatened submarket is high.
A second type of interdependence is the complementarity in demand across the incumbent's
submarkets. We operationalize this idea by assuming that the premium incumbent operates
and maximizes the joint profits in two submarkets—j and k—with complementary demand, and the
entrant threatens to operate in submarket j. The inverse demand functions in market j are
Pj1 = 1 − Qj1 − sQj2 for the low-cost product and Pj2 = 1 − θQj2 − sQj1 for the premium product,
where Qj1 = qe and Qj2 = qij2. The inverse demand function in submarket k is Pk = 1 − θQk + mQj,
where Qk = qik, Qj = Qj1 + Qj2, and m 2 [0, 1] represents the degree of complementarity between
the two submarkets. When m = 0, the demand functions in the two submarkets are independent:








, and Qk= 1θ 1−Pkð Þ. When









, Qk= 1θ 1−Pkð Þ+ θ−sθ θ−s2ð Þ 1−Pj1
 
+ 1−sθ θ−s2ð Þ 1−Pj2
 
, and all con-
sumers in submarket j also demand the product in submarket k.
As we prove in Section 4 of Appendix S1, the deterrence interval f D−f Að Þ decreases with m
when ri is small enough relative to ci and m is not too small. That is, the premium incumbent will
face a narrower range for deterrence if the entrant provides a more complementary product. Put
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differently, the premium incumbent will be better off accommodating than deterring an entrant as the
complementarity between the premium incumbent's submarkets increases. To use an example,
assume a monopolistic incumbent operates in markets for both coffee and sugar and experiences
threat of entry in the market for coffee. The incentive for the incumbent to deter entry in the coffee
market is decreasing in the degree of complementarity between the sugar market and the coffee mar-
ket. This is because the increased demand for sugar would offset the incumbent's lost market share in
the coffee market.
Proposition 3. Following the threat of entry from a low-cost entrant, if investment costs are suffi-
ciently low relative to operating costs, a premium incumbent will be less likely to invest in deterrence
capacity when there is greater demand complementarity between its threatened and unthreatened
submarkets.
In sum, we have proposed a general theory of incumbent responses to entry threats. We show that
when capacity investment costs are sufficiently lower than operating costs, an incumbent's response
depends on its market position, as well as the interdependencies within and across its submarkets. In
the following section, we introduce the empirical setting where these theoretical propositions are
translated into empirically testable hypotheses.
4 | THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry provides an attractive context for our study for several reasons. First, at least dur-
ing the period of our study, there are two distinct groups of firms, each occupying a market position
that has been defined by academic scholars, business practitioners, and policy makers. For example,
Federal Aviation Administration statistics are broken down by the categories of FSCs and LCCs.
FSCs provide a greater variety of services and network linkages, more legroom, larger planes, a
higher percentage of first-class and business-class seats, and frequent flyer programs. FSCs also
adopt a multi-hub-and-spoke route structure, whereas LCCs usually offer limited point-to-point ser-
vices on selected segments.
Second, there is dynamic competition in the airline industry. Air travel is a non-storable product
with volatile demand. As a result, price, capacity, and quality of service vary significantly not only
across routes, but also across different flights on the same route. There is robust empirical evidence
that airlines engage in competition through price-cutting, capacity expansion, and quality differentia-
tion (Ciliberto & Tamer, 2009; Joskow, Werden, & Johnson, 1994; Morrison, 2001; Williams, 2013;
Windle & Dresner, 1999). The majority of the empirical studies on airline competition, however,
have focused on price or price–cost margin.
Third, since the 1990s, FSCs have been threatened by the growth of LCCs. According to Mueller
& Hüschelrath (2012), from 1997 to 2009, LCCs increased their domestic market share from 13 to
29%; one of the leading LCCs is Southwest Airlines, which increased its market share from 7% to
16%. The expansion of Southwest over time provides an opportunity to empirically identify the
responses of incumbent carriers to entry threats at the route level.
Finally, the airline industry is heavily regulated, and detailed data on pricing, capacity, and quality
are available at the firm-route level. The airline industry has also been the subject of extensive aca-
demic research, which provides a benchmark for the current study.
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5 | HYPOTHESES
Building on the propositions of our model, we derive empirical predictions about incumbents' capac-
ity responses to entry threats from Southwest Airline. We focus on three sources of heterogeneity:
variation in the incumbent's market position (premium versus low-cost, as defined by its demand
function and operating cost), variation in demand substitutability between customer segments within
the threatened submarket of a premium incumbent, and variation in demand complementarity
between the premium incumbent's threatened and unthreatened submarkets.
In the airline industry, FSCs provide a premium service and attract consumers who value quality
more than price. At the same time, FSCs incur higher operating costs. In contrast, LCCs save operat-
ing costs by providing a standardized, low-cost service that is targeted at more price sensitive con-
sumers. According to Proposition 1, when capacity investment costs are sufficiently low relative to
operating costs, a premium incumbent (e.g., an FSC incumbent) will be more likely to invest in
deterrence capacity as compared with a low-cost incumbent (e.g., an LCC incumbent).
A critical condition of Proposition 1 is that capacity investment costs are sufficiently lower
than operating costs. To test the validity of this condition in the airline industry, we investigate
actual cost data for Delta, an FSC, and Southwest, an LCC. We find that the average capital costs
for both airlines were less than 10% of their operating costs, satisfying the condition for
Proposition 1.3
Another critical condition for capacity deterrence to be effective is that it has to be credible or
not easily reversible (Dixit, 1979; Mazzeo, 2002). There are two ways that an incumbent can
deploy capacity to threatened routes. The first way is to acquire aircrafts, through either purchase
or leasing, from the market. To see if such acquisition is reversible, we collect industry data to
assess the degree of capital commitment. We first observe that airlines spend large sums of
money to purchase aircrafts that cannot be easily resold in a short period of time. Around 70% of
the aircrafts operated by airlines are owned rather than leased during our sample period
(International Air Transport Association, 2016); the ratio is even higher for established (incum-
bent) airlines (The Economist, 2012). In addition, we observe that even though airlines do lease
some aircraft to maintain flexibility, especially during economic downturns, these leases are typi-
cally longterm agreements. Prior research notes that even operating leases in tight credit markets
can last over 8 years (Gibson, 2008). In sum, due to the significant acquisition cost and long
holding period, capacity acquired by airlines from the market is not easily reversible and there-
fore can serve as a commitment mechanism.
A second way that an incumbent airline can deploy capacity to threatened routes is via excess
capacity resulting from random demand shocks (Lieberman, 1987a). We argue that excess capacity
in different submarkets can be deployed to deter entry in a threatened submarket, and reversing such
deployment is not easy in our setting for at least two reasons. First, airlines usually publish their
flight schedule several quarters before the flying quarter,4 which causes rigidity in schedule reversal.
Second, incumbent airlines operate on multiple heterogeneous routes. The occurrence of positive
demand shocks on non-threatened routes is likely to be idiosyncratic. Therefore, the need for the
3Using actual cost data, we find that the unit operating cost per available seat mile (ASM) in 2013 was 13.89 cents for Delta
and 11.06 cents for Southwest. The unit capital cost per ASM was 1.08 cents for Delta and 1.05 cents for Southwest, both less
than 10% of their operating costs. Delta had a slightly higher average capital cost but a significantly lower capital cost relative
to its operating cost.
4Consumers can book their tickets hundreds of days in advance with major airlines (https://thepointsguy.com/2017/11/how-
far-in-advance-book-airfare/).
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incumbent to reverse capacity deployment is hard to predict, which makes reversal uncertain ex post
and deployment for deterrence more credible ex ante.5
To some extent the issue of credible commitment is context-specific and subject to empirical
examination. We therefore check industry reports and empirical studies on the airline industry to con-
firm the face validity of our arguments. There is a large number of complaints made by LCCs that
FSC incumbents such as American Airlines and Air Canada aggressively expand capacity (by either
adding flight frequencies or using larger aircrafts) when faced with the threat of LCC entry (Edlin &
Farrell, 2002; Lazar, 2000; Transportation Research Board National Research Council, 1999). Empir-
ical evidence also suggests that the FSC incumbents' capacity expansion in threatened markets is
consistent with an objective to deter entry: “By committing significant additional capacity to a partic-
ular market, a dominant national carrier is able to drive variable costs and fares to levels that often
make the market unprofitable for an LCC competitor offering a much less attractive product to con-
sumers” (Williams, 2013 p. 3).
Therefore, the airline industry satisfies the conditions for Proposition 1, which we can translate
into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Following the threat of entry from an LCC, an FSC incumbent will be more likely to
increase its capacity on the threatened route than an LCC incumbent.
When firms operate in multiple submarkets, the fit of these submarkets to the firms' core strategy
is likely to vary. Such variation in fit between an incumbent's market position and submarket charac-
teristics provides differential opportunities for potential entry. While the existing literature suggests
that submarkets that have a tighter fit with an incumbent's position pose greater costs of entry
(Rivkin, 2000), our model explicates the “fit” with different types of interdependencies.
The degree of within-submarket demand substitutability gauges customers' tendency to switch
between products. Proposition 2 states that a premium incumbent will be better off deterring than
ignoring or accommodating a low-cost entrant when the threatened submarket comprises more sub-
stitutable customer segments. Intuitively, because customers who prefer a premium product to low
price are unlikely to perceive the product offered by a low-cost entrant as a substitute, they are less
likely to switch to the low-cost firm post entry. Accordingly, the low-cost firm will be more likely to
stay away from submarkets where a larger proportion of potential customers demand premium prod-
ucts and will instead enter submarkets with more price-sensitive customers. Foreseeing that, the pre-
mium incumbent is expected to be less aggressive in entry deterrence in submarkets with
predominantly premium customers.
In the airline industry, business travelers put more value on premium quality service and are less
price sensitive than leisure travelers. On routes with a higher percentage of business travelers, an
LCC is less likely to attract enough customers and is therefore less likely to enter. Accordingly, the
FSC incumbent will be less likely to expand capacity in response to a threat of entry.
Hypothesis 2. Following the threat of entry from an LCC, an FSC incumbent will be less likely to
increase its capacity on a threatened route that has a larger percentage of business travelers.
5To empirically examine the persistence of capacity utilization on individual routes, we examine the flight-level on-time
performance database maintained by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. We extract from the database the unique aircraft
identifier associated with each flight. Based on the aircraft identifiers we find that during our sample period, an aircraft was
flown on a specific route for an average of 36 months. In comparison, an aircraft was flown on a specific threatened route for
an average of 51 months. This suggests a fairly high degree of capacity commitment at the route level.
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Between-submarket demand complementarity influences an incumbent's response in a different
way. When a low-cost firm enters a submarket, the premium incumbent will lose customers in the
contested submarket. However, the increased competition induced by entry also increases total
demand in the contested submarket, thereby benefiting the incumbent's complementary and
unthreatened submarkets. Proposition 3 states that a premium incumbent will be better off accommo-
dating than deterring a low-cost entrant that offers a more complementary product or service. This is
consistent with the empirical finding in the hotel industry that entry with a complementary
(e.g., agglomeration) benefit to the incumbent faced a more accommodating response (McCann &
Vroom, 2010).
If a significant proportion of customers in the contested submarket also demand products or
services from the incumbent in its unthreatened submarkets, then the incumbent has less incen-
tive to deter entry in the contested submarket. An apt example in the airline context is domestic
routes that connect to the incumbent's international hubs (that is, domestic airports with a large
number of international flights operated by the FSC incumbent). Entry by an LCC into these
routes is expected to increase the number of passengers who will connect to the incumbent's
international flights (which LCCs do not serve) and increase the incumbent's joint profits on
domestic and international flights. As a result, the FSC incumbent will be less aggressive in
deterring entry.
Hypothesis 3. Following the threat of entry from an LCC, an FSC incumbent will be less likely to
increase its capacity on a threatened route that connects to its international hubs.
6 | EMPIRICAL DESIGN
6.1 | Data and sample
Theoretically, an incumbent can respond to a potential entrant using different competitive tools, such
as price, capacity, and quality differentiation. In the airline industry, prior studies have found that
from 1993 to 2004, incumbent carriers lowered their price and quality level in response to the threat
of Southwest entry (Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008; Prince & Simon, 2015). We, therefore, first com-
pared incumbent airlines' responses along these dimensions to ensure consistency with prior studies.
We then investigated capacity response.
Our data come mainly from three sources. The first is the Origination and Destination Survey
(DB1B) collected by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). It is a 10% random sam-
ple of airline tickets from reporting carriers, aggregated to the quarterly level to protect confidenti-
ality. It has been used to study incumbents' price response to Southwest's entry threats
(e.g., Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008). The second data source is a survey of flight-level on-time per-
formance collected by BTS. It has been used to study delays, though most prior studies sample
only small parts of it (e.g., Forbes & Lederman, 2010). The third data source is the OAG Sched-
uler, a commercial dataset that contains information about seat capacity on every flight. It has been
used to study market entry, though again most prior studies sample only small parts of it
(e.g., Berry & Jia, 2010).
We drew data from these databases for the years between 2003 and 2012. We limited our study to
the 11 major incumbent airlines that had the most complete data: six FSCs (American, Continental,
Delta, Northwest, United, US Airways), and five LCCs (JetBlue, AirTran, ExpressJet, Midwest,
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Alaska).6 Following prior studies, we restricted our study to non-stop flights between the 100 busiest
airports (by enplanement) within the continental United States, which account for 85% of the total
flights flown in the United States.
Table 1 compares the key operational statistics of FSCs, LCCs (excluding Southwest), and South-
west. It shows that Southwest charged the lowest price per route. It followed a consistent high-
density strategy, flying a large number of flights on a small number of routes and using only one type
of aircraft (a Boeing 737 with 137 economy-class seats) to standardize its operations across routes. It
enjoyed the fastest aircraft turnaround and had the shortest delays. Table 1 also reveals clear differ-
ences between FSCs and LCCs. FSCs flew longer routes, charged higher prices, had larger planes,
and experienced shorter delays.
We followed Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) to identify routes facing an entry threat from Southwest.
Figure 2 presents an illustration. In 2005, Southwest operated the route between Chicago Midway and
Cleveland, as well as five routes from Philadelphia (to Hartford, Ft. Lauderdale, West Palm Beach,
Raleigh/Durham, and Los Angeles, respectively). In October 2006, Southwest entered Washington Dulles
with four new routes to Chicago Midway, Las Vegas, Tampa, and Orlando, respectively. Assume an
incumbent airline was already flying the three routes from Washing Dulles to Cleveland, Hartford, and
Philadelphia, respectively. Because Southwest already operated in Cleveland, Hartford, and Philadelphia,
it would likely start to fly the three routes connecting Washington Dulles with these airports. These three
routes were therefore “threatened” by Southwest's entry and were included in our sample.
We also followed prior studies (Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008; Prince & Simon, 2015) and exam-
ined incumbent responses several quarters (i.e., up to 3 years) before the entry threat. This is because
the market is usually aware of an airport entry well before the date of entry. First, airlines often
announce their entry into an airport several quarters before actually entering, in order to advertise
TABLE 1 Comparative statistics for FSCs, non-Southwest LCCs, and Southwest
FSCs LCCs Southwest
Average ticket pricea 199 159 137
Average route distanceb 905 647 812
Number of passengers per routeb 1,463 1,371 2,362
Number of flights per routeb 131 317 654
Number of seats per routec 10,553 9,131 14,934
Number of seats per aircraftb 170 100 137
Scheduled flight timeb 133 105 126
Diff. between ramp to ramp and airtime per flight in minutesb 28 25 16
Average load factorb 0.75 0.74 0.71
Departure delay in minutesc 12.7 14.5 9.2
aBased on BTS DB1B data.
bBased on BTS T100 data.
cBased on BTS on-time performance data.
6There were some mergers among the sample firms. For example, Southwest acquired AirTran in 2010. However, in the BTS
databases, the two carriers continued to report separately as of 2013, so we treated them as separate carriers. For other mergers,
we treated the carriers as separate until they started to report as a combined carrier in the BTS databases. As a robustness
check, we also treated them as one merged entity throughout the sample period (e.g., treating Northwest as Delta for the entire
sample period). Results were similar.
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and sell tickets, hire workers, etc. In the case of Washington Dulles, Southwest announced its entry
6 months before the first day of operation. In addition, information about future entry diffuses as the
entrant starts to negotiate gate leases and invest in infrastructure at the target airport. For each threat-
ened route, we followed prior studies and limited the sample period to the 25-quarter window sur-
rounding the quarter during which Southwest started operating in the second endpoint of the route.
To focus attention on threatened rather than actual entry, we dropped routes in which Southwest
started operating in the second endpoint and the threatened route at the same time.
For the remaining threatened routes, we constructed three samples. Sample 1 is an intersection set
of the DB1B and OAG, aggregated to the carrier-route-quarter level. Because of the DB1B's 10%
reporting and quarterly aggregation rules, Sample 1 has only about 30,000 observations. We used
Sample 1 to study price responses to compare to prior studies (e.g., Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008).
Sample 2 is an intersection set of the on-time performance and OAG databases, aggregated to the
carrier-route-month level. Because of the smaller coverage of the on-time database, Sample 2 has
about 70,000 observations. We used Sample 2 to study quality responses to compare to prior studies
(e.g., Prince & Simon, 2015). Sample 3 is the most comprehensive and our main sample. It is based
on the OAG dataset and aggregated to the carrier-route-month level. It contains 88 airports, 1,264
routes, and about 120,000 observations. We used Sample 3 to test the hypotheses about capacity
responses. Studying capacity responses on Samples 1 and 2 generated similar results.
6.2 | Variables
Our main dependent variable, SeatCapacityrit, is the total number of installed seats on flights flown
by carrier i on route r (a directional origin–destination pair) at time t. We also examined other com-
petitive instruments to compare with prior studies. Pricerit, is the quarterly average ticket price for all
direct and round-trip flights. Departure Delayrit is the average minutes between scheduled and actual
departure time. Because different carriers had different baseline values for these variables, we log-
FIGURE 2 Part of southwest route network in 2005 and 2006
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transformed the dependent variables to reduce value dispersion. The log transformation also made
the estimated coefficients easier to interpret: They reflect percentage changes in the dependent vari-
able with a unit change in the independent variable.
Our independent variables are a set of time dummies for periods including and surrounding the
quarter when Southwest threatened a route and time dummies for periods including and after South-
west entered (started flying) the route. These dummies are mutually exclusive. Coefficients on these
time dummies reflect the relative sizes of the dependent variable in each dummy period relative to its
average value in the excluded period, that is, when all the time dummies assume a value of zero.
All regressions include carrier-route, carrier-time (quarter or month), and origin-airport-time
(quarter or month) fixed effects. In the delay analysis, we also controlled for airport congestion. We
first calculated congestion at the hourly level, which is the number of flights departing from or arriv-
ing at an airport during any given hour, divided by the maximum number of flights departing from
or arriving at that airport in that hour at any point between 2003 and 2012. We then took the monthly
average of that ratio.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample routes. About 82% of the observations were
for FSCs. On average, a carrier charged US$181 (exp(5.20)) for each ticket sold and flew 7,708 (exp
(8.95)) seats on each route every month. An average flight was 9.5(exp(2.25)) minutes late at depar-
ture, which is similar to the results in prior studies of on-time performance (e.g., Forbes & Lederman,
2010). The average airport operated at 50% of its maximum capacity.
6.3 | Specifications
We first replicated prior studies on incumbent responses to Southwest's entry threats by using a simi-
lar specification (Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008; Prince & Simon, 2015). In the pricing analysis,
because the DB1B pricing information is available only at the quarter level, we used a quarterly
model.
TABLE 2 Summary statistics for sample routes
Definition Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Quarter of SW
threat
SW “threatens” the route
during the quarter (1,0)
0.05 0.23 0 1 1.000
(2) Price Quarterly average ticket
price for all direct and
round-trip flights, logged
5.20 0.41 2.37 7.24 −0.007 1.000
(3) Seat capacity Number of installed seats
flown, logged
8.95 0.988 3.62 11.17 −0.016 −0.030 1.000
(4) Departure delay Time between scheduled
and actual departure time
in minutes, logged
2.25 0.79 −0.69 5.41 −0.005 −0.030 0.091 1.000
(5) Congestion Number of flights passing
the origin airport divided
by the maximum number
of flights passing the
origin airport during the
sample period
0.50 0.12 0.003 1 0.003 0.023 −0.026 0.051 1.000
All data are monthly except for price, which is available only at the quarterly level.




βτ τQbefore=after SW threatð Þr Qθ+τQð Þ




γτ τQ after SWentryð Þr qe+τQð Þ
+γ 3−12Q after SWentryð Þrt+εrit ð1Þ
where Pricerit is defined as before. Qθ is the quarter during which the route was threatened by South-
west (SW), and Qe is the quarter during which the route was entered. τQ before/after SW threat are
time dummies indicating that the current quarter is τ (from 1 to 10) quarters before or τ (from 0 to 2)
quarters after SW's threat. τQ after SW entry are time dummies that indicate that the current quarter
is τ (from 0 to 2) quarters after SW's entry. 3 − 12Q after SW threat and 3 − 12Q after SW entry are
time dummies that indicate that the current quarter is from 3 to 12 quarters after SW's threat and
entry, respectively. Coefficients on the time dummies reflect the relative sizes of the dependent vari-
able in each period relative to its average value in the excluded period, that is, the 12th and 11th
quarters before the quarter of SW's threat. We clustered standard errors by route-carrier to account
for serial correlation in the error terms.
In the capacity and quality analyses, we used specifications similar to Equation 1, except that the
analyses were at the monthly rather than quarterly level.
After confirming that our results are qualitatively similar to those of prior studies, we simplified
the specifications by collapsing the time dummies before SW's threat into one time dummy variable
(1–10Q before SW threat), by collapsing the time dummies after SW's threat and before SW's actual
entry into one time dummy (0–12Q after SW threat), and by collapsing the time dummies after SW's
actual entry into one time dummy (0–12Q after SW entry).
We used different subsamples to capture heterogeneity in incumbent responses to Southwest's
entry threats. To test Hypothesis 1, we separated the sample into threatened routes that were operated
by FSC incumbents and those that were operated by LCC incumbents. To test Hypothesis 2, we sep-
arated the sample into FSCs' threatened routes that were expected to have a large number of business
travelers and those that were expected to have a large number of leisure travelers. We used informa-
tion provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Census Bureau about total personal
income, total personal income coming from lodging and food services, and total number of business
establishments in the county where an airport is located. We defined threatened routes that were
expected to have a large number of non-business travelers as routes that either originated from or
arrived at a county with an above-median percentage of personal income coming from lodging and
food services but a below-median number of business establishments.7 We expect these routes to be
destinations for price-sensitive leisure travelers, whereas other routes are more likely to attract busi-
ness travelers. To test Hypothesis 3, we separated the sample into FSCs' threatened routes that con-
nect to hubs that have a large number of international flights, routes that connect to hubs with few
international flights, and non-hub routes.
7Using total employment of business establishments and average size of business establishments (measured using
employment) generated similar results.
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7 | RESULTS
7.1 | FSC versus LCC incumbents' responses to entry threats
Table 3 provides an overview of incumbents' responses to Southwest's entry threats using various com-
petitive instruments. We first replicated the specifications from prior studies (Goolsbee & Syverson,
2008; Prince & Simon, 2015) that used data from an earlier time period (1993–2004). We separately
estimated FSC and LCC responses. Columns 1 and 2 examine price responses. As in Goolsbee and
Syverson (2008), we weighted observations by the average number of passengers flown by an incum-
bent carrier on the route to assess the “aggregate” responses and to mitigate high volatility on low-
volume routes. The coefficients show similar price responses from FSC and LCC incumbents in
response to the threat of Southwest's entry. Neither responded significantly to the threat of entry, but
both dropped their price by 12–20% after Southwest's actual entry. In general, our results on price
responses are not as strong as those in prior studies. Perhaps this is because after a decade of price wars,
in recent years price-cutting has become less feasible, or is seen as a less effective instrument (Berry &
Jia, 2010).
Columns 3 and 4 examine quality responses in terms of on-time performance. In line with prior
studies (Prince & Simon, 2015), we find that FSC incumbents experienced more delay in response to
the threat of Southwest entry. In supplementary analyses, we observed that FSC incumbents reduced
scheduled flight duration (i.e., reduced slack), which might have contributed to the deterioration in
on-time performance. Again, LCCs did not experience a significant change in delay.
The last two columns of Table 3 examine seat capacity. The results show that FSCs increased their
seat capacity in response to entry threat—by 26% by the quarter in which Southwest had threatened
(but not entered) the route, by 35% by the quarter in which Southwest had entered the route, and by
41% by the end of the third year after Southwest's entry. In contrast, LCC incumbents reduced their seat
capacity (to accommodate Southwest's entry), though these changes were mostly statistically insignifi-
cant. These results support Hypothesis 1. As we will discuss later in the “Additional robustness checks”
subsection, we also observed that FSC incumbents increased flight frequencies. Note that an increase in
seat (and flight) capacity coupled with a reduction in scheduled flight duration likely contributed to the
increased delays for FSC flights that was observed in Column 3. At the same time, while the increase in
delay and seat supply could lower price, the increased flight frequencies could also provide a closer
match to consumers' preferred schedule, thereby increasing consumers' willingness to pay. These two
opposite effects might explain the lack of significant price change in Column 1.
7.1.1 | Alternative explanations
We performed a few tests to ensure that our main results on incumbents' capacity responses are robust
to alternative explanations. One alternative explanation is that the incumbent might have increased
capacity in response to increased market demand rather than Southwest's (threatened or actual) entry.
To completely address this alternative explanation, we need to include route-quarter/month fixed effects
to capture any market and time specific local demand shocks. However, such fixed effects will be per-
fectly correlated with our threat and entry time dummies, which would prevent us from identifying any
effect. As a compromise, in addition to route-carrier and carrier-quarter/month fixed effects that are con-
trolled for in prior studies (e.g., Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008), we included origin-time (in year/months)
fixed effects. Collectively, these fixed effects account for unobservable time-invariant route-carrier spe-
cific factors, carrier-time specific factors, and origin airport-time specific factors that would influence
capacity decisions. In addition, as a robustness check, Table 4 includes route-half-year fixed effects.
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Compared with the results in the last two columns of Table 3, the first two columns of Table 4 show
smaller but similar effects.
Moreover, if all participants were just responding to increasing demand in the market, we should
see Southwest enter rather than avoid routes where incumbents had increased capacity. In the last
four columns of Table 4, we separated the threatened routes into those that Southwest entered within
3 years after the threat and those that Southwest did not enter within 3 years after the threat. Results
show that Southwest did not enter routes where the FSC incumbent had significantly increased
capacity. Instead, it entered routes where the FSC incumbent had not significantly increased capacity.
These results contradict the alternative explanation of a common response to market demand.
Results in Tables 3 and 4 also support our arguments that capacity expansion can be used as a
credible commitment by incumbents in the airline industry. For example, Table 3 shows that, after
controlling for route-specific demand shocks, the FSC incumbent maintained the increased level of
capacity over a long-period (i.e., 3 years) after entry threat, even after Southwest's entry. If the
incumbent were not committed, it would have scaled back its capacity after Southwest's entry.
Table 4 provides additional evidence that Southwest did take capacity expansion by the incumbent
TABLE 3 An overview of responses to entry threats
Price Departure delay Seat capacity
FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC
10Q before SW threat 0.075 [0.001] 0.017 [0.417] 0.047 [0.194] −0.079 [0.478] 0.040 [0.010] 0.037 [0.258]
9Q before SW threat −0.025 [0.200] 0.010 [0.722] 0.141 [0.000] 0.070 [0.467] 0.147 [0.000] −0.072 [0.092]
8Q before SW threat −0.045 [0.023] 0.005 [0.847] 0.099 [0.008] 0.06 [0.526] 0.141 [0.000] −0.075 [0.115]
7Q before SW threat −0.031 [0.117] 0.034 [0.399] 0.048 [0.212] 0.111 [0.319] 0.131 [0.000] −0.05 [0.284]
6Q before SW threat 0.006 [0.805] 0.006 [0.876] 0.044 [0.287] −0.071 [0.503] 0.160 [0.000] −0.045 [0.375]
5Q before SW threat −0.007 [0.772] −0.002 [0.949] 0.104 [0.011] −0.017 [0.874] 0.185 [0.000] −0.068 [0.187]
4Q before SW threat −0.012 [0.633] −0.017 [0.688] 0.015 [0.730] −0.097 [0.437] 0.218 [0.000] −0.015 [0.803]
3Q before SW threat 0.017 [0.541] −0.028 [0.540] 0.017 [0.715] 0.068 [0.590] 0.247 [0.000] −0.005 [0.931]
2Q before SW threat 0.045 [0.125] −0.018 [0.690] 0.043 [0.381] −0.086 [0.407] 0.224 [0.000] −0.002 [0.974]
1Q before SW threat 0.035 [0.252] −0.013 [0.782] 0.079 [0.125] −0.094 [0.419] 0.248 [0.000] 0.018 [0.796]
Quarter of SW threat 0.001 [0.979] −0.038 [0.431] 0.108 [0.042] −0.123 [0.297] 0.262 [0.000] 0.022 [0.755]
1Q after SW threat −0.003 [0.932] −0.032 [0.524] 0.065 [0.257] −0.035 [0.789] 0.266 [0.000] 0.075 [0.318]
2Q after SW threat 0.020 [0.595] −0.006 [0.915] 0.121 [0.057] 0.028 [0.843] 0.271 [0.000] 0.05 [0.546]
3–12Q after SW threat 0.008 [0.843] 0.006 [0.936] 0.192 [0.005] 0.057 [0.714] 0.355 [0.000] 0.064 [0.449]
Quarter of SW entry −0.121 [0.011] −0.031 [0.694] 0.184 [0.012] −0.047 [0.767] 0.353 [0.000] −0.041 [0.661]
1Q after SW entry −0.131 [0.009] −0.175 [0.026] 0.196 [0.011] 0.002 [0.989] 0.392 [0.000] 0.038 [0.682]
2Q after SW entry −0.191 [0.000] −0.169 [0.038] 0.206 [0.007] −0.011 [0.950] 0.425 [0.000] 0.021 [0.836]
3–12Q after SW entry −0.133 [0.009] −0.197 [0.022] 0.165 [0.043] −0.154 [0.403] 0.411 [0.000] −0.019 [0.856]
Congestion 0.076 [0.480] 0.505 [0.009]
Carrier time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier route FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,986 5,904 55,700 11,825 97,559 21,731
Adjusted R2 0.580 0.770 0.554 0.532 0.876 0.871
Time reflects each year–quarter pair in price estimations and each year–month pair in quality and capacity estimations. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the carrier-route level. p-values are included in square brackets.
ETHIRAJ AND ZHOU 1561
as a credible commitment and avoided threatened routes where the incumbent had increased
capacity.
A second alternative explanation is that there might be multiple incumbents operating on the same
route, and they were just responding to each other's competitive moves rather than to Southwest's
entry threat. To address this concern, in the first four columns of Table 5, we separated the threatened
routes into three groups, those with only FSC incumbents, those with only LCC incumbents, and
those with both types of incumbents. We aggregated the quarterly dummies to longer time dummies
to save space. The results show that FSC incumbents increased their capacity mainly on threatened
routes operated by only FSC incumbents (by 22% within 12 quarters of the threat). There was no sig-
nificant response on other threatened routes where only LCCs operated or both FSCs and LCCs oper-
ated.8 This supports our argument that FSC incumbents were responding to Southwest's entry threat.
TABLE 4 Seat capacity responses: Robustness checks with route-half-year fixed effects
All routes




FSC LCC FSC LCC FSC LCC
10Q before SW threat 0.023 [0.288] 0.041 [0.345] 0.034 [0.173] 0.036 [0.486] −0.074 [0.412] 0.05 [0.669]
9Q before SW threat 0.110 [0.002] −0.047 [0.529] 0.114 [0.007] −0.102 [0.328] 0.053 [0.608] −0.114 [0.554]
8Q before SW threat 0.120 [0.003] 0.002 [0.987] 0.133 [0.007] −0.2 [0.160] 0.068 [0.465] −0.146 [0.567]
7Q before SW threat 0.125 [0.015] 0.077 [0.444] 0.126 [0.036] −0.307 [0.031] 0.117 [0.285] −0.102 [0.694]
6Q before SW threat 0.159 [0.005] 0.108 [0.343] 0.168 [0.014] −0.239 [0.114] 0.116 [0.303] −0.239 [0.464]
5Q before SW threat 0.195 [0.001] 0.058 [0.639] 0.225 [0.003] −0.251 [0.143] 0.093 [0.439] −0.163 [0.610]
4Q before SW threat 0.238 [0.000] 0.081 [0.574] 0.295 [0.000] −0.18 [0.343] 0.103 [0.434] −0.214 [0.588]
3Q before SW threat 0.259 [0.000] 0.167 [0.277] 0.321 [0.000] −0.141 [0.532] 0.134 [0.324] −0.158 [0.685]
2Q before SW threat 0.207 [0.006] 0.238 [0.140] 0.264 [0.007] −0.02 [0.932] 0.081 [0.572] −0.191 [0.660]
1Q before SW threat 0.222 [0.005] 0.249 [0.151] 0.306 [0.004] 0.01 [0.971] 0.074 [0.631] −0.237 [0.600]
Quarter of SW threat 0.235 [0.005] 0.259 [0.171] 0.332 [0.003] −0.004 [0.988] 0.05 [0.760] −0.358 [0.491]
1Q after SW threat 0.233 [0.007] 0.305 [0.128] 0.320 [0.006] −0.13 [0.670] 0.018 [0.915] −0.027 [0.959]
2Q after SW threat 0.222 [0.014] 0.3 [0.167] 0.317 [0.010] −0.117 [0.738] 0.022 [0.905] 0.001 [0.998]
3–12Q after SW threat 0.272 [0.005] 0.239 [0.310] 0.382 [0.004] −0.206 [0.572] 0.062 [0.747] −0.16 [0.770]
Quarter of SW entry 0.252 [0.008] 0.157 [0.506] 0.06 [0.745] −0.278 [0.612]
1Q after SW entry 0.351 [0.001] 0.091 [0.709] 0.127 [0.516] −0.311 [0.577]
2Q after SW entry 0.398 [0.000] 0.055 [0.829] 0.126 [0.531] −0.269 [0.635]
3–12Q after SW entry 0.395 [0.001] −0.093 [0.742] 0.154 [0.470] −0.407 [0.503]
Carrier time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier route FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Route half-year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,540 21,692 73,101 11,288 22,532 8,257
Adjusted R2 0.915 0.915 0.900 0.932 0.945 0.899
Time reflects each year–quarter pair in price estimations and each year–month pair in quality and capacity estimations. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the carrier-route level. p-values are included in square brackets.
8As a robustness check, we also examined a much smaller number of routes with only one incumbent (FSC or LCC); results
were similar.
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A third alternative explanation is that LCCs are more likely to have overlapping operations with
Southwest across their route networks. Such multimarket contact could create mutual forbearance
and soften LCC incumbents' competitive interaction with Southwest. To address this possibility, we
added multimarket contact and its interactions in the last two columns of Table 5. We followed
Gimeno and Woo (1999) to sum the number of routes outside the focal route where the incumbent
and Southwest competed. We normalized the sum with the total number of routes the incumbent
operated, though results are similar if we take the sum without normalizing it. On average, an FSC
incumbent shared 89 routes or 7% of its route network with Southwest, whereas an LCC incumbent
shared 35 routes or 10% of its route network with Southwest. Coefficients in the last two columns of
Table 5 suggest that multimarket contact, on average, did not influence an FSC incumbent's capacity
decision on a route, but it did dampen the FSC incumbent's capacity responses to both threatened
and actual entry from Southwest. In contrast, multimarket contact on average was positively corre-
lated with an LCC incumbent's capacity decision on a route, but it dampens the LCC incumbent's
TABLE 5 Seat capacity responses with heterogeneous incumbents and multimarket contact
FSC-only LCC-only Both-type routes All routes














































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin time
FEs
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier route
FEs
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,951 3,031 34,756 17,165 97,559 21,731
Adjusted R2 0.850 0.715 0.894 0.883 0.876 0.872
Robust standard errors clustered at the carrier-route level are included in parentheses. p-values are included in square brackets.
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capacity responses to actual (not threatened) entry from Southwest. After controlling for multimarket
contact, the coefficients of threat and entry time dummies remain similar.
7.2 | Substitution within submarkets
Table 6 compares the incumbent's capacity responses on threatened routes split by the expected pres-
ence of business and leisure travelers. The results show that the FSC incumbent's capacity responses
were concentrated mostly on routes with leisure travelers (by 10% within 12 quarters of the threat).
On routes that expected a large number of business travelers, the FSC incumbent hardly responded
to threatened or even actual entry by Southwest. These results support Hypothesis 2. In comparison,
LCC incumbents did not respond on either type of routes.
7.3 | Complementarity across markets
Table 7 compares FSC incumbents' capacity responses on their hub- and non-hub routes. The results
show that FSC incumbents responded aggressively on their non-hub routes (increasing capacity by
19% within 12 quarters after Southwest's threat of entry) and on routes that connected to their exclu-
sive domestic hubs—hubs not shared with other airlines (16% within 12 quarters after Southwest's
threat of entry). These results are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2: FSC incumbents deter more
aggressively where the cost of capacity expansion is expected to be sufficiently low relative to oper-
ating cost (e.g., domestic hubs) and where the entrants are more likely to offer directly substitutable
products (e.g., non-hub routes).
However, on threatened routes where the entrant might bring about demand that is complemen-
tary to demand in the incumbent's other routes—routes connecting to the incumbent's international
hubs—we do not observe significant capacity response from FSC incumbents to entry threat. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 is supported.
TABLE 6 Seat capacity responses on leisure versus business routes
Business routes Leisure routes
FSC LCC FSC LCC
1–10Q before SW
threat
−0.057 (0.080) [0.475] 0.015 (0.059) [0.803] 0.086 (0.021) [0.000] −0.038 (0.045) [0.399]
0–12Q after SW
threat
0.004 (0.089) [0.965] 0.202 (0.133) [0.133] 0.095 (0.025) [0.000] −0.008 (0.051) [0.877]
0–12Q after SW
entry
0.105 (0.103) [0.311] −0.055 (0.209) [0.791] 0.097 (0.041) [0.017] −0.016 (0.065) [0.804]
Carrier time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier route FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,239 3,322 75,919 17,277
Adjusted R2 0.867 0.898 0.883 0.872
Robust standard errors clustered at the carrier-route level are included in parentheses. p-values are included in square brackets.
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7.4 | Additional robustness checks
We ran a battery of supplementary analyses to check the robustness of our results. These additional
analyses are not included in the paper due to space limit but are available from the authors. First, to
make sure these results are not influenced by market size, we excluded carrier-route pairs where the
number of passengers in a quarter was less than 200 (Williams, 2013). The results were similar. We
also removed markets for which the airline tickets were either less than $25 or more than $2,500, as
such prices are likely due to typographical errors or special deals (Williams, 2013). The results were
similar.
Second, change in seat capacity can be due to either a change in the number of flights or a change
in plane capacity. To disentangle the two, we separately estimated the number of flights and seats per
flight. Results were similar except that on incumbent-exclusive domestic hub routes, FSC incum-
bents increased capacity mainly by using larger planes rather than more frequent flights, probably
due to congestion and availability of larger planes at the hubs. On non-hub routes, FSC incumbents
increased capacity by using both more frequent flights and larger planes.
Third, it is possible that the FSC incumbents were responding to indirect competition from
Southwest rather than the threat of entry. For example, in Figure 2, after Southwest entered
Washington Dulles (having already been operating in Chicago Midway and Cleveland), cus-
tomers might switch to flying Southwest flights from Washington Dulles to Cleveland via Chi-
cago Midway rather than flying incumbent flights directly from Washington Dulles to Cleveland.
We argue that even if the customers ignore the inconvenience of airport wait times, they are likely
to fly the indirect flights only if Southwest flights on the two legs were competitively cheaper than
the incumbent's direct flight. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that while Southwest's
average ticket price of $137 was lower than the FSCs' average ticket price of $199, it was not
cheaper to fly two Southwest flights than it was to fly one FSC flight. This undercuts the indirect
competition argument. Nevertheless, we sought to re-estimate the results using a subsample of
data excluding all threatened entries that closed a tripartite network. This subsample avoids the
indirect competition problem. Unfortunately, excluding entries that closed a tripartite network
resulted in too small of a sample, and our estimated models failed to converge in the presence of
fixed effects.











1–10Q before SW threat 0.031 (0.031) [0.321] 0.041 (0.032) [0.203] 0.120 (0.042) [0.005] 0.157 (0.025) [0.000]
0–12Q after SW threat 0.034 (0.034) [0.317] 0.043 (0.035) [0.215] 0.157 (0.050) [0.002] 0.192 (0.031) [0.000]
0–12Q after SW entry 0.116 (0.054) [0.033] 0.136 (0.056) [0.015] 0.161 (0.063) [0.011] 0.231 (0.048) [0.000]
Carrier time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier route FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 35,279 33,091 18,393 62,082
Adjusted R2 0.913 0.914 0.920 0.855
Robust standard errors clustered at the carrier-route level are included in parentheses. p-values are included in square brackets.
ETHIRAJ AND ZHOU 1565
8 | DISCUSSION
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of market positions and submarket interde-
pendencies on competitive interactions between firms. Employing route-level data in the airline
industry, we compared the responses of FSC incumbents and the responses of LCC incumbents, and
the responses of FSC incumbents across their different submarkets, to entry threat from Southwest
Airlines. Our empirical results support predictions from our formal model and indicate a few broad
empirical patterns. First, competitive responses vary by market position. FSC incumbents expanded
capacity, while LCC incumbents did not respond significantly. Second, significant variation in com-
petitive responses exists even within an incumbent across its submarkets. This variation in responses
correlated with differences in submarket interdependencies. FSC incumbents expanded capacity less
aggressively in threatened submarkets that had less substitutable customer segments and in threat-
ened submarkets that were more complementary with their unthreatened submarkets.
These results connect the research on entry deterrence in industrial organization with the research
on market positions in strategic management. Specifically, we show that that incumbent firms' past
choices of market positions and submarket interdependencies influence their competitive behavior.
These past choices provide two sources of positional immutability: While one set of past choices
(e.g., those about submarket interdependencies) generate barriers that prevent firms from a different
position to imitate and enter, another set of past choices (e.g., those about products and costs) gener-
ate position-specific incentives that encourage a tough defense by the incumbent, thereby deterring
entry. We see our effort to both formalize the empirical analyses and operationalize the theoretical
model as crucial to understanding the conditions and mechanisms that drive the variation in entry
deterrence decisions across different incumbents or across different submarkets for the same incum-
bent. For example, while research in industrial organization often assumes that the lower operating
cost offers a competitive advantage in market entry, our results suggest that the marginal capacity
investment cost of the incumbent is an important signal that the potential entrant should pay attention
to. For another example, while prior studies have argued that strategic (positional) similarity leads to
greater rivalry, our results suggest that this claim might be contingent upon specific tradeoffs an
incumbent faces among ignoring, deterring, and accommodating entry.
Our findings also enrich the competitive dynamics literature in strategy. They imply that by strate-
gically exploiting or avoiding submarket interdependencies, firms can employ a unique set of tools
to manage competitive interaction. More generally, strong complementarities across submarkets
reduce the need for costly deterrence. In contrast, markets with strong substitution across customer
segments pose greater risks for incumbents that in turn necessitate deterrence. Therefore our study
provides a more nuanced answer to the question of positional immutability. We show that competi-
tive interaction between firms within or across market positions can be influenced by the nature of
interdependencies across submarkets. This helps to reconcile the observed empirical patterns of com-
petitive interaction which include both deterrence and accommodation responses by the same firm
across submarkets.
Finally, this paper extends recent empirical work on entry deterrence in a few ways. By studying
incumbent response to the threat of entry (rather than actual entry), this study mitigates the concern
of endogeneity between incumbent response and entry. In addition, empirical studies of the airline
industry for the previous decade (from late 1990s to the early 2000s) have concluded that FSC
incumbents reduced prices in response to the threat of Southwest entry (Goolsbee & Syverson, 2008)
and saw their service quality (in terms of on-time performance) deteriorate as a consequence
(Prince & Simon, 2015). Our results show that, after these earlier episodes of price wars, during the
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more recent decade (2003–2012), FSC incumbents used capacity expansion as a major entry deter-
rence tool. By empirically examining a broad range of competitive responses, such as price and qual-
ity differentiation, in addition to capacity, we offer a comparison with the results in prior studies and
a more coherent analysis of competitive responses to entry threat than prior studies.
A main limitation of our study is that it is based on data from one industry with its own idiosyn-
cratic characteristics, which could potentially affect the generalizability of the study. We offer two
speculations about generalizability. First, Southwest represents a particularly strong low-cost compet-
itor. The fact that the entry threat of a low-cost leader triggers different responses from premium and
low-cost incumbents presents important fodder for future research.
Second, the airline industry is unique in the sense that it is evolving toward a situation where the
majority of customers in the industry are becoming increasingly price sensitive and less willing to
pay for differentiation. A recent editorial on Bloomberg View described airline customers' willing-
ness to pay as follows:
Ultimately, the reason airlines cram us into tiny seats and upcharge for everything is that
we're out there on Expedia and Kayak, shopping on exactly one dimension: the price of
the flight. To win business, airlines have to deliver the absolute lowest fare. And the
way to do that is. …. to cram us into tiny seats and upcharge for everything. If Ameri-
can consumers were willing to pay more for a better experience, they'd deliver it. We're
not, and they don't. (McCardle, 2015)
It is certainly possible that price differences between FSCs and LCCs are narrowing over time,
and this in turn is reducing the differentiation advantage for FSCs. Market leaders in other contexts
(e.g., boat racing as studied by Ross & Sharapov, 2015) have also been found to imitate their fol-
lowers' courses of action—thereby reducing differentiation—to stay ahead of competition. That said,
there continue to be important differences between the strategies of FSCs and LCCs that we docu-
ment in Table 1. Further, strategies such as hub-spoke networks, connecting flights, frequent traveler
programs, and airline lounges continue to be important differentiators for FSCs. In sum, we believe
that generalizability is an issue in this study as it is in any single-industry study. Replication across
industries is necessary before we can attempt to extend the implications of our study to a broader
range of industry contexts.
In conclusion, this paper highlights the impact of interdependencies on firms' competitive
responses to entry threats. Despite being a single-industry study, it directs our attention to an under-
studied question in strategy: how market positions and submarket interdependencies influence inter-
firm competitive interactions. We have taken great care to document and explain our methodology to
enable replication across industries. We hope this effort spurs more formal and empirical studies of
competitive interaction.
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